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Abstract
We exploit the recent West African Ebola epidemic as an event that necessitated the
provision of a common-interest public good, Ebola control measures, to empirically
investigate the effect of public good provision on state legitimacy. Our regression
results show that state legitimacy, measured by trust in central authorities and will-
ingness to pay taxes, increased disproportionately in districts that experienced a
greater exposure to Ebola. We argue, supported by results from SMS-message-based
surveys, that one potentially important channel underlying this finding is a greater
valuation of Ebola control measures in regions with intense Ebola transmission. Ev-
idence further indicates that the effects of Ebola exposure are more pronounced in
regions where the governments responded relatively robustly to the epidemic. To ad-
dress concerns related to the possibility that the spread and intensity of the epidemic
are influenced by local differences in state legitimacy, we rely on a 2SLS-IV approach
for identification. Observed Ebola case numbers are instrumented with simulation-
derived predicted numbers. Variation in timing and intensity of the simulated EVD
epidemic is restricted to aspects that are plausibly exogenous with respect to changes
in legitimacy.
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1 Introduction
State capacity, the state’s ability to implement policies, is an important determinant of
economic development (Besley and Persson, 2009; Acemoglu et al., 2015). In much of
the developing world, states struggle to raise taxes, provide public goods and administer
their territories effectively. Lack of legitimacy is potentially an important factor explaining
these low levels of state capacity (e.g., North, 1981, p.53; Englebert, 2002, p.92). With-
out legitimacy, governments cannot rely on citizens to voluntarily comply with centrally
mandated policies, making implementation of policies costly, the provision of public goods
inefficient and capacity building difficult (e.g., Gilley, 2009, p.147f.; Levi, 2006).1 Recent
theoretical research (Besley and Persson, 2009; Gennaioli and Voth, 2015; Alesina et al.,
2017) suggests that the provision of common-interest public goods—typically provoked by
external threats such as wars—increased state capacity in historical times. It is unclear,
however, whether the provision of common-interest public goods increases state legitimacy
and capacity in the modern era. This paper contributes to filling this gap.
We investigate how infectious disease control, a particular type of common-interest public
good, influences state legitimacy.2 For our empirical analysis, we focus on the recent out-
break of the Ebola virus disease (EVD) in West Africa from 2013 to 2016 and the resulting
provision of Ebola control measures in the three most affected countries: Guinea, Liberia,
and Sierra Leone. The dimension of the West African EVD epidemic was unprecedented,
both in terms of geographic spread and intensity. Over the course of the epidemic, more
than 28,000 Ebola cases were reported (WHO, 2016b). In addition to direct health effects,
the epidemic also disrupted economic and social interactions (Overseas Security Advisory
Council, 2015; Bowles et al., 2016). Governments, and under their auspices international
organizations, reacted by developing control measures. The implementation of, and com-
pliance with, these public health policies was instrumental in eradicating the disease (e.g.,
WHO Ebola Response Team, 2016; Blair et al., 2017). Arguably, the effect of the epi-
demic on state legitimacy depends on people’s perception of these policies. In regions
where the risk of contracting Ebola is greater, valuation and perception of government-led
control efforts is likely higher. Furthermore, there is clear evidence from the political sci-
1Legitimacy and trust in government is especially important in the context of public health interven-
tions, where acceptance of, and compliance with, policies is crucial for success (e.g., Alsan and Wanamaker,
forthcoming; Blair et al., 2017).
2Since transmission occurs via human interaction, infectious diseases represent a negative externality.
It therefore lies in the interest of all members of an interconnected group, e.g., a nation, to contain the
spread of infectious diseases.
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ence literature that the effect of natural disasters on political support crucially depends on
the robustness of the government’s response, where support increases with effectiveness of
the response (e.g., Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011; Gasper and Reeves, 2011). Similarly,
we expect that perception of the state improves with increased quantity and quality of
government response.
To empirically assess the validity of these hypotheses, we use pre- and post-epidemic
individual-level survey data from the Afrobarometer. The panel-type nature of the data
allows us to employ a difference-in-difference estimation strategy in which we can account
for time-invariant location-specific characteristics, such structural differences in levels of
trust.
Concerns related to measurement error in Ebola case numbers as well as endogeneity be-
tween Ebola exposure and legitimacy, however, remain. Endogeneity issues arise because
exposure to Ebola as well as the effectiveness of policies potentially depend on state legiti-
macy (e.g., Blair et al., 2017). Anecdotal evidence indicates that where legitimacy was low,
compliance with control measures was initially weak, leading to more intense transmission.
To obviate these issues, we rely on a linear 2SLS approach for identification, where ob-
served Ebola prevalence is instrumented with simulated prevalence. The simulations are
based on an epidemiological mathematical model in which the outbreak is represented as a
network of local epidemics that are interconnected across districts. The model incorporates
solely predetermined (and time-invariant) population numbers, Euclidean distances as well
as generic parameters of the Ebola disease. Differences in state legitimacy or perception
of the state that reportedly influenced spread and intensity of the West African epidemic
(Manguvo and Mafuvadze, 2015) do not generate variation in the model. The simulation-
derived prevalence thus allows us to identify variation in the observed Ebola prevalence
that is plausibly exogenous with respect to local differences in state legitimacy and other
socioeconomic characteristics.
Employing our linear 2SLS-IV regressions approach, we find that state legitimacy— proxied
by trust in central government (parliament and president) and police—increased dispro-
portionately in regions with higher exposure to the epidemic. An increase in average Ebola
prevalence of one case per 100,000 people raises post-epidemic trust in all three government
entities by around 0.15 standard deviations compared to the pre-epidemic era. The effect
on trust in central state is also reflected in a relative increase in the willingness to pay
taxes. To investigate the plausibility of differential valuation of control measures as a po-
tential channel underlying these effects, we conducted a retrospective mobile-phone-based
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survey in Liberia. The data show that valuation of Ebola-control-related state interven-
tions is greater among individuals who resided in high Ebola risk regions. Furthermore, we
find suggestive evidence that the epidemic’s effects on state legitimacy are particularly pro-
nounced in regions that experienced a relatively large influx of relief-effort related resources
as well as in areas where implied quality of Ebola control (measured by the difference be-
tween simulated and observed prevalence) was comparatively higher. These heterogeneities
support the interpretation that our results are reflecting changes in perceptions induced
by the governments’ response to the epidemic rather than by the exposure to the disease
itself. In a final step, we show that the Ebola-epidemic-induced effects on trust are also
reflected in voting behaviour. Support for the presidential candidate of the incumbent
party increased in areas that saw an intense Ebola transmission relative to regions with
low transmission intensities.
An important assumption underlying our empirical strategy is that the simulated diffusion
process specifically captures the progression of the Ebola epidemic and influences state
legitimacy only via realised Ebola transmission intensity. Falsification tests provide support
for the plausibility of these assumptions. We further conduct a number of robustness checks
to document the stability of our results. These include the use of alternative measures of
Ebola exposure, varying the set of control variables and employing different approaches to
compute standard errors.
Overall, our results show that a one-time provision of a common-interest public good—in
our case triggered by a devastating epidemic—can increase state legitimacy, an otherwise
slowly evolving determinant of economic development, within a short period of time. An
implication of this finding is that the supply of public goods could constitute an instrument
with which policy makers in developing countries can increase state legitimacy and thereby
overcome historically rooted capacity constraints. However, given the short period of time
that has passed since the end of the epidemic as well as the transitory nature of the public
good, our estimates should only be interpreted as short-run effects. It remains to be seen
whether these Ebola-induced attitudinal changes persist. If so, there is hope that the
West African Ebola epidemic may—in contrast to the devastating effects on health and
economic activity observed in the short run (Bowles et al., 2016)—have positive effects on
determinants of long-run growth.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: In the next section, we discuss how
our study relates and contributes to the literature. In Section 3, we provide background
information on the West African Ebola epidemic. We then outline the empirical strategy
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in Section 4 before presenting the data and summary statistics in Section 5. The results
of the regression analysis are discussed in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our work directly relates to the political science literature (mentioned in the introduction)
that identifies state legitimacy as a fundamental determinant of state building and economic
development (e.g., Migdal, 1988; Weber, 1984; North, 1981; Englebert, 2002) and analyses
factors that influence legitimacy (Hutchison and Johnson, 2011; Gilley, 2009). Closely
connected to our analysis is further the branch of this literature that investigates the
relationship between public good provision, state legitimacy and capacity. The mostly
qualitative results indicate that the efficient provision of public goods raises state legitimacy
(e.g., Rotberg, 2003; Easton, 1965, p.278; Fukuyama, 2015). Our findings empirically
validate the qualitative evidence.
Highly relevant for our paper are further studies that investigate the origin of state capacity
and state building. This literature primarily focuses on the analysis of historical roots of
capacity building in a general context (e.g., Besley and Persson, 2009, 2010; Gennaioli
and Voth, 2015; Alesina et al., 2017). Therein, the provision of common interest public
goods is identified as an important factor that facilitates capacity building. A number of
recent studies, however, specifically investigate the historical causes of weak state capacity
in Africa (e.g., Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Nunn, 2008; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011;
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013). In contrast to our work, the results of these studies
are silent about potential factors that induce changes in state capacity in the modern era.
Another body of literature our paper contributes to analyses how the government’s response
to natural disasters affects political accountability and citizens’ perception of the state.
Overwhelmingly, the studies find that the electorate rewards incumbents for efficient post-
disaster management. Typically, the increase in vote share is interpreted as the consequence
of effective disaster relief providing a strong signal of quality and capacity of the government
(Healy and Malhotra, 2010; Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011; Gasper and Reeves, 2011;
Cole et al., 2012). In a recent paper, Gallego (2015) proposes aid-induced availability
of resources for buying votes as an alternative mechanism underlying the post-disaster
increase in support for incumbents. In addition to changing voting behaviour, Fair et al.
(2017) show that natural disasters can increase political engagement (turnout and political
literacy) and thereby strengthen the democratisation process in developing countries. We
5
complement this literature by analysing the effects of health epidemics—and the ensuing
response of governments—on citizens’ attitudes towards the state and support for political
parties in power.
Also linked to our work are studies that analyse the association between state capacity
and level of development (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2015; Dell et al., 2017; Dincecco and
Katz, 2016). These papers document the crucial importance of state capacity for economic
prosperity. In a recent study, Dell and Querubin (2018) document that regions exposed to
more intensive bombings during the Vietnam War experienced a decrease in state capacity
and legitimacy.
Our paper also builds on, and contributes to, the literature on disease and development.
Various channels have been proposed through which adverse disease environments influence
economic development. Prominently discussed is the relative importance of direct effects on
contemporaneous health (e.g., Gallup and Sachs, 2001; Sachs and Malaney, 2002; Bleakley,
2007) versus indirect effects working through the disease environment’s influence on the
quality of institutions (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2003). Our results suggest the existence
of a further channel that links infectious diseases to development: Successful government-
led disease control may not only improve public health but also increase state legitimacy
and thereby capacity.
Finally, the results of our study also directly speak to the line of recent research concerned
with assessing the socio-economic effects of the West African Ebola epidemic. A number
of studies document its devastating impact on the economies in the short run (Thomas et
al., 2015; Davis, 2015; Bowles et al., 2016). We complement these studies by analysing the
epidemic’s effect on fundamental factors of growth, rather than looking at direct measures
of economic prosperity. Changes in these fundamentals may take a long time to materialise
in observable macroeconomic effects.
3 Background
Ebola virus disease, first identified in 1976, causes a highly contagious infectious disease
that is associated with a case-fatality rate of 69 to 88 percent (Van Kerkhove et al., 2015).
Starting point of outbreaks is a transmission event from an unknown animal reservoir into
the human population. The virus then spreads among humans via direct contact with
bodily fluids of infected individuals (Gire et al., 2014; Rewar and Mirdha, 2014). Absent
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a medical cure,3 preventive measures, such as avoiding physical contact and practising
careful hygiene, as well as isolation of infected people (alive and dead) are the sole defenses
against the spread of Ebola. Compliance with these infection-control measures are therefore
central to successful containment and eradication of the disease (WHO Ebola Response
Team, 2016).
In the 41 years since discovery, 24 Ebola outbreaks have been reported. The West African
epidemic (2013–2016) stands out as the most intensive and geographically widespread
event. In contrast to previous episodes, the outbreak was not restricted to isolated rural
areas, but also spread into densely populated regions. Over the course of the epidemic, a
total of 28,616 cases were reported, of which 11,310 resulted in death (WHO, 2016b). The
overwhelming majority—more than 99.9%—of cases occurred in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra
Leone. In addition to direct health effects, the epidemic had an extremely disruptive impact
on economic activity and, more generally, social interactions within these three countries
(e.g., Overseas Security Advisory Council, 2015; Bowles et al., 2016).
Figure 1, panel (a), depicts the timeline of the epidemic. The first case occurred in Guinea’s
Guéckédou prefecture in late December 2013. From there, the virus spread to neighbouring
Liberia and Sierra Leone. Prevalence rates were relatively low until June 2014, when case
numbers dramatically increased. On 7 August 2014, the WHO declared the epidemic a
‘Public Health Emergency of International Concern’. Panel (b) in Figure 1 illustrates that
the intensification of transmission was not a locally restricted phenomenon. The fraction
of districts4 for which Ebola cases were reported (grey line) also rose substantially starting
in June.
Reacting to the intensification of the epidemic, all three countries established a national
Ebola task force or committee in charge of coordinating the implementation of control
measures. Chairing these groups was the president of the respective country (DuBois et al.,
2015; Marston et al., 2017). The government-led control strategies—supported by national
and international partners—were initially ineffective in containing the disease. Among the
main factors contributing to the sharp increase in case numbers were the lack of resources,
such as skilled health care workers5 and miscommunication (Chan, 2014; WHO, 2014).
3At the time of writing, a medical cure or approved vaccine for Ebola does not exist. A clinical
vaccination trial conducted during the final phase of the West African epidemic produced promising results
(Henao-Restrepo et al., 2017). The vaccine has since been approved for experimental use during the most
recent Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in May 2017 (Maxmen, 2017).
4See Section 5 for a definition of districts.
5A report by the WHO (2015), for example, documents that infected health care workers made up
16% of the total Ebola cases during the initial phases of the epidemic. Case fatality rates among health
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Figure 1: Panel (a) Figure depicts the number of Ebola cases during the epidemic (December 2013–April
2016). Panel (b) shows the cumulative distribution function of total EVD cases as well as the share of
total districts in which Ebola was observed in a given week. Data: WHO situation summary, 11 May 2016.
Equally important, low legitimacy of, and trust in, governments and health authorities
meant that control measures were not complied with or actively opposed, rendering them
ineffective (e.g., Manguvo and Mafuvadze, 2015; World Health Organization, 2015; Blair
et al., 2017). However, with increased awareness of the epidemic’s dimension as well as
the involvement of local traditional leaders and communities, attitudes and behaviours
changed in later stages of the epidemic. Resistance largely abated and disease control
measures gained legitimacy and were adopted (Mark, 2014; Neal, 2015; Africa APPG,
2016). These attitudinal and behavioural changes—manifested as compliance with control
measures—are viewed as central factors that contributed to the reduction in transmission
intensities observed between October 2014 and January 2015 (Carrión Mart́ın et al., 2016;
care workers were initially even higher than among non-health care workers (World Health Organization,
2014a).
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Tsai et al., 2015). Government-led containment of the epidemic was further facilitated by
the increased availability of resources after the intensification of international response in
September 2014.6 On 29 March 2016, the WHO terminated the Public Health Emergency
of International Concern status of the outbreak and the epidemic was declared officially
over on 9 June 2016. However, Figure 1, panel (b), shows that the vast majority, 85% of
all cases, had already occurred in 2014.
First qualitative evidence from post-epidemic surveys indicates that the majority of pop-
ulation judged the national government to have been effective in controlling the epidemic
(RIWI, 2015; Armah-Attoh and Okuru, 2016). This suggests that the epidemic—more
precisely the ensuing public health interventions—may have improved legitimacy of the
state. The remainder of the paper is concerned with empirically assessing the existence of
this effect.
4 Empirical Strategy
Using simple OLS to estimate the effect of the Ebola epidemic on state legitimacy will
likely produce biased coefficients. As discussed in the introduction, reverse causation and
measurement error, in particular, are potential sources of bias. To obviate these problems,
we employ a 2SLS approach and instrument observed Ebola prevalence with simulated
prevalence.7,8 In a first step, we regress reported EVD prevalence on simulated prevalence.
The regression is given by:
Ei,d,c,t = θ Si,d,c,t + ΩXi,d,c,t + αd,c + τc,t + ψi,d,c,t. (1)
The dependent variable, Ebola prevalence (Ei,d,c,t), reflects the average number of Ebola
cases per 100,000 people in individual i’s district of residence d (located in country c) in year
t. Simulated prevalence is represented by Si,d,c,t. The vector Xi,d,c,t contains individual-level
controls, such as age, sex and ethnicity. In all regressions we allow these characteristics
6On 19 September 2014, the UN Security Council created the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emer-
gency Response (UNMEER) with the ”objective of scaling up the response on the ground and establishing
unity of purpose among responders in support of the nationally led efforts”. http://ebolaresponse.un.
org/un-mission-ebola-emergency-response-unmeer.
7The simulations are described in detail in Section 5.2.
8A similar identification strategy, in which the effect of a regional shock on individual-level outcomes
is estimated using an instrumental variable approach, is employed in Rohner et al. (2013), Autor et al.
(2014) and Lowes and Montero (2018).
9
to have different effects in the pre- and post epidemic era by interacting them with year
dummies. District-specific fixed effects are symbolised by αd,c, country-time-fixed effects by
τc,t, and the idiosyncratic error term by ψi,d,c,t. All individual-level regressions are weighted
using sample weights provided by Afrobarometer; the standard errors are clustered at the
district level.
In the second step, we use the predicted values derived from regression Eq.(1) to quantify
the effect of Ebola prevalence on state legitimacy. These predictions only reflect the part
of the variation in observed prevalence that is due to disease-specific and time-invariant
characteristics, which themselves are exogenous with respect to the actual spread of the
West African epidemic. The second-stage regression takes the following form:
yi,d,c,t = β Êi,d,c,t + ΦXi,d,c,t + µd,c + γc,t + εd,c,t, (2)
where yi,d,c,t represents the outcome for individual i residing in district d and country
c in year t. Êi,d,c,t symbolises predicted Ebola prevalence obtained from the first-stage
regression Eq.(1); the vector Xi,d,c,t represents the individual-level controls. The inclusion
of district-fixed effects (µd,c) and country-time-fixed effects (γc,t) implies that—in analogy
to a standard difference-in-difference approach—we exploit only within-district variation
in our empirical analysis. That is, we abstract from district-specific time-invariant level
differences such as differences in ethnic composition, level of economic activity, population
composition or attitudes towards the state.
The validity of our identification strategy hinges upon two crucial assumptions: (a) The
model-derived predictions have to be correlated with actual prevalence, and (b), the pre-
dictions must not be correlated with the error term. The plausibility of these assumptions
are discussed in Sections 5.2 and 6.
5 Data, Simulations, and Descriptive Analysis
5.1 Data
To analyse the effect of Ebola exposure on state legitimacy, we draw on pre-and post-
epidemic individual-level survey data from the Afrobarometer. The pre-epidemic surveys
(round 5) were conducted between June 2012 and April 2013, the post-epidemic surveys
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(round 6) between March and June 2015.9 We combine these repeated cross sections to
analyse the effect of the epidemic on state legitimacy by looking at changes in trust in par-
liament, president, and police.10 Trust in these entities are seen as close proxies for state
legitimacy (Newton, 2007; Weatherford, 1992; Hutchison and Johnson, 2011). As an addi-
tional proxy for state legitimacy, we use willingness to pay taxes. All outcomes represent
ordinal variables with values ranging from zero to three, and in the case of willingness to
pay taxes from zero to four. To facilitate interpretation, we standardise outcome variables
to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. In total, our individual–year dataset
encompasses 2 periods and 6,201 individuals.
Our measure for Ebola exposure is based on subnationally stratified weekly numbers of new
Ebola cases which are published in the WHO Ebola Situation Reports. For Guinea and
Sierra Leone, data are available at the second subnational administrative level, referred
to as prefectures and districts, respectively. EDV cases for Liberia are reported at the
first subnational administrative level (counties). The number of territorial units in Guinea,
Liberia and Sierra Leone are 34, 15 and 14 respectively.11 For simplicity, we will collectively
refer to these units as ‘districts’. For these administrative regions, weekly information on
new Ebola cases are available for the period between 30 December 2013 and 11 May 2016.12
For each district and week, we compute the prevalence of Ebola, defined as the number
of Ebola cases per 100,000 people. The (time-invariant) district-level population numbers
used in the calculations stem from Gridded Population of the World, v4. Based on the
weekly prevalence rates, we define our measure for Ebola exposure as the average Ebola
prevalence between the start of the epidemic and the beginning of the Afrobarometer survey
fieldwork in the district in which a given individual resides.13,14 It is well documented that
the Ebola case data, especially the district-stratified data, are prone to measurement and
reporting error (e.g., WHO, 2014, Gignoux et al., 2015, or Scarpino et al., 2015). However,
by instrumenting reported cases with simulated numbers, we mitigate issues related to
mismeasurement.
9Even though the WHO declared the epidemic officially over only on 9 June 2016, 96% of all cases
occurred before round 6 of the Afrobarometer surveys were conducted.
10Afrobarometer questions used in our analysis are listed in Table A.1.
11The average size of the administrative units is similar across all countries: 7,196km2 (Guinea),
6,395km2 (Liberia), and 5,186km2 (Sierra Leone).
12EVD case data are available at http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.ebola-sitrep




Ebola prevalence in districtd, where d is the
district in which individual i resides.




We simulate the spatiotemporal spread of the Ebola epidemic using a modified version of
the simulation model developed in Backer and Wallinga (2016).15 Therein, the outbreak is
represented as a network of local epidemics that are interconnected across districts through
a gravity model. Inputs into the model are disease-specific parameters as well as gravity
parameters. In contrast to Backer and Wallinga (2016), we do not feed the model with
parameter values calibrated to the West African Ebola outbreak, but use estimates derived
from other Ebola outbreaks (all values listed in Table 1). Therefore, variation in the disease
generation process is restricted to aspects that are unrelated to the spatiotemporal spread
of the West African epidemic. This property is crucial in the context of our analysis as
local socio-economic conditions can influence path and intensity of the epidemic. State
legitimacy, for example, reportedly influenced compliance with control measures. This, in
turn, affected extent and intensity of the epidemic (Manguvo and Mafuvadze, 2015). The
use of parameter values fitted to the West African epidemic as inputs in the simulations
would therefore result in the simulations being endogenous with respect to our outcome
variables.
Local intensity of Ebola transmission is crucially determined by the effective reproduction
number, i.e. the expected number of individuals that are infected by a single infected
person. Local disease intensity is further influenced by the time period—referred to as
serial interval—between the onset of symptoms with the primary patient and the onset of
symptoms with the secondary patient. Combining these two determinants, the number of




ω (τ) Id (t− τ) . (3)
The number of locally generated new Ebola cases in week t, Λd(t), depends on the (sim-
ulated) number of cases Id in the τ weeks preceding current week t. The function ω (τ)
represents the serial interval distribution and determines the likelihood of onset within τ
weeks from infection. We assume that the time between infection and onset, i.e., the serial
interval, takes a maximum of 6 weeks, i.e., T = 6 (cf. Backer and Wallinga (2016)). Values
for the mean and standard deviation of ω (·) are taken from Maganga et al. (2014) who
15Description and code available at http://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=10.
1371/journal.pcbi.1005210#sec008.
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base their estimates on the Ebola outbreak in Democratic Republic of Congo in 2014.
The reproduction number, R(t), is a key parameter in disease progression models. For
the purposes of our study, we set R(t) = 2.347. This corresponds to the average of R(t)
estimates obtained in the non-West African-specific studies reviewed in Van Kerkhove et
al. (2015).16,17 A reproduction number above unity implies that the entire population will
eventually be infected with the Ebola virus. To contain contagion within our model, we
allow R(t) to fall below one, and therefore the epidemic to die out, if cumulative case
numbers reach a threshold. Specifically, we set R(t) to 0.5 once the threshold has been
reached (Backer and Wallinga, 2016). The threshold is defined as a random share s̃ of
the district’s total population and is therefore unrelated to the timing and sequence of the
implementation of actual control measures. The share is drawn from a uniform distribution
with support [s/2, 2s]. Based on data from Maganga et al. (2014), we set s = 0.0007.18
Formally, the threshold-dependent reproduction number is given by:
Rd(t) =
2.347 if t ≤ tbd0.5, t > tbd, (4)
where tbd = min
t
{t : Id(t) > Ibd} and Ibd is the randomly drawn threshold value.
The total number of cases in district d and week t is not only determined by local disease
dynamics, as described in Eq.(3), but also by the number of Ebola cases imported from
other districts. To model the migration process, we assume that a constant fraction φ of
infected persons leaves a given district d in each week. These cases then scatter across the
remaining districts (j 6= d) according to the bilateral connectivity matrix m. Specifically,
the probability with which an infected individual who leaves district d migrates into district
16Van Kerkhove et al. (2015) conduct a systematic review of epidemiological parameters from Ebola
outbreaks. For non-West African epidemics, the review shows that R(t) estimates range between 1.34 and
4.71. The range of estimates for the West African epidemic is even wider; values lie between 1.26 and
9. However, Figure B.1 illustrates that the estimates for R(t) are concentrated around a value of 2, for
both the West African epidemic and other epidemics. All parameter estimates of the studies reviewed
in Van Kerkhove et al. (2015) are listed in Table S2 in the Data Records Section of Van Kerkhove et al.
(2015).
17Note that values of R(t) during the West African epidemic are likely to have varied across different
countries (e.g., WHO Ebola Response Team, 2014). However, incorporating such differences would poten-
tially introduce endogeneity into our simulation model as differences in transmission intensities (partly)
reflect differences in state legitimacy (see Section 3).
18For comparison, the overall prevalence rate for the West African epidemic was 0.0012.
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Connectivity increases with population of the district of destination (popj) and decreases
with bilateral distance (distd,j). Both variables, population numbers and Euclidean dis-
tances, are time-invariant and predetermined. The gravity parameters γdist and γpop are
taken from Wesolowski et al. (2015), who base their mobility estimates on Kenyan mobile
phone data.19 The value of φ is also based on these gravity estimates. It is defined as the
average share of population that moves across districts in a week.20
Combining Eqs. (3) and (5), the number of Ebola cases in district d and week t can be
written as the fraction of locally generated cases that does not leave the district plus the
cases imported from other districts:




The model described in Eq.(6) represents a generic spatiotemporal model of Ebola trans-
mission. The only aspect that makes it West-African specific is the population dispersion
matrix m, the population numbers used in generating the (random) threshold for the
change in Rd(t) as well as the choice of starting point. However, with exception of the
starting point, these are time-invariant features and therefore exogenous with respect to
the spatiotemporal spread of the epidemic. Omitting the starting point in the regression
analysis leaves the results unchanged.
To construct our instrument, we first run the simulation model in Eq.(6) one thousand
times and take the mode of simulated cases for each district and week. Starting point
for each simulation is Guéckédou, where patient zero was observed in December 2013.
In a second step, we then determine simulated prevalence rates by dividing simulated
case numbers by population. As a final step, we compute the instrument as average
19Using mobile phone data implies that the gravity parameters capture short-run mobility, i.e., the type
of movement we focus on. Census-based estimates, on the other hand, reflect the effects of distance and
population concentration on more permanent movements (Wesolowski et al., 2015).
20More specifically, we compute the share of total population that travels to other districts in any given
week based on the gravity parameters of Wesolowski et al. (2015). We then define φ as the average of
these ‘mobility shares’ across all districts.
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Table 1: Simulation Inputs
Input Description Value Source/Basis
Time-invariant district-level characteristics
popj population of districts true value Gridded Population of the World, v4
distd,j bilateral Euclidean distance true value Computed using spatial analysis software.
Parameters local disease progression Λ
RH(t) reproduction number before threshold 2.347 Van Kerkhove et al. (2015)
RL(t) reproduction number after threshold 0.5 Backer and Wallinga (2016)
Ibd threshold R, defined as I
b
d = s̃× popd s̃ ∼ U (s/2, 2s), with s = 0.0007 Maganga et al. (2014)
ω (·) serial interval distribution mean=16.1, sd=4.4, T=6 Maganga et al. (2014)
Parameters inter-district connectivity m
φ migration fraction 0.043 Wesolowski et al. (2015)
γdist gravity parameter distance –2.05 Wesolowski et al. (2015)
γpop gravity parameter population 1.22 Wesolowski et al. (2015)
predicted Ebola prevalence in an individual’s district of residence between the start of the
epidemic and the beginning of the survey fieldwork. In the remainder of this paper, we
use this simulation-based instrument to quantify the effect of the Ebola epidemic on state
legitimacy.
5.3 Descriptive Analysis
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the key variables. On average, districts reported
303 Ebola cases during the epidemic. This corresponds to a mean prevalence of 0.856
cases per 100,000 people over the two survey years (of which the first one was Ebola
free). Figure B.2 depicts the density of observed average prevalence along with the density
function of simulated average prevalence. While both densities exhibit a similar shape, with
prevalence concentrated around the same value, the (right) tail of observed prevalence is
longer. This difference could arise, for example, because our simulations explicitly abstract
from socioeconomic aspects that could have intensified the spread of the disease.
Figure 2 below visualises the regional variation in average Ebola exposure exploited in our
analysis. Panel (a) depicts the average observed prevalence rates (classified into quintiles
separately for each country); panel (b) represents the spatial variation in simulation-derived
predicted Ebola prevalence. Starting with the next section, we formally assess how these
differences in exposure influenced state legitimacy.
A general worry, discussed in more detail in Section 6, is that variation in regional Ebola
exposure are correlated with other, Ebola unrelated, district-specific differences. In Table
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Key Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Ebola prevalence 0.856 1.470 0 5.939 6201
Simulated prevalence 0.157 0.248 0 2.280 6201
Trust in parliament (SD) 0 1 -1.350 1.403 6201
Trust in president (SD) 0 1 -1.494 1.079 6201
Trust in police (SD) 0 1 -1.045 1.642 6201
Willingness to pay taxes (SD) 0 1 -0.507 3.689 6201
(a) (b)
Figure 2: Panel (a) depicts the country-sepcific quintiles of average Ebola prevalence per 100,000 people.
Panel (b) depicts the country-sepcific quintiles of average simulated Ebola prevalence per 100,000 people.
3 we therefore investigate the extent to which simulation-derived predicted prevalence is
correlated with various time-invariant and time-varying district-level characteristics, once
country-specific dummies are accounted for. We start with the two key drivers in our
spatial diffusion process. These are population numbers as well as network connectivity to
Guéckédou (i.e., the starting point of the epidemic).21 Unsurprisingly, these two aspects
are strongly correlated with predicted Ebola prevalence. The gravity-type nature of our dif-
fusion model implies that both, a larger population and greater connectivity to Guéckédou
21For a given district, the network connectivity to Guéckédou is computed as the direct (bilateral)
connectivity to Guéckédou (given by Eq.(5)) plus the indirect connectivity via all other districts.
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results in more (simulated) Ebola cases being imported from other districts. Raw distances,
on the other hand, are not statistically significantly correlated with predicted Ebola ex-
posure. The same is true for the pre-epidemic provision of public goods, which is proxied
roughly by the district-level averaged probability of being located in walking distance to a
school, health clinic, and police station, respectively.22
To investigate if predicted prevalence is correlated with the level or change in income, we
use, in the absence of better data, a number of crude proxies. The value of crop production
per capita (IIASA/FAO, 2012) and the presence of minerals (such as diamonds or gold,
Tollefsen et al. (2012)) are used as proxy for difference in the regional level of income.
For neither of these variables do we find a statistically significant correlation with our
simulations. This is also true when we look at the change in average rainfall, temperature
and drought exposure between the pre- and post epidemic survey years.23 These variables
are commonly used as a proxy for income shocks in economies dominated by the agricultural
sector (e.g., Burke et al., 2015; Marshall et al., n.d.; Harari and La Ferrara, Forthcoming).24
Overall, Table 3 shows that the degree of correlation between simulated Ebola prevalence
and district-level characteristics is limited. The only two aspects that are statistically
significantly correlated with simulated prevalence are population numbers and network
distance to Guéckédou. In the next section, we discuss in detail to what extent this result
poses a threat to our identification strategy.
6 Results
In this section, we first establish that state legitimacy disproportionately increased among
individuals who resided in areas with high Ebola transmission intensities. We then provide
support for the validity and stability of this finding. In the second part, we discuss potential
mechanisms underlying our baseline results.
22The proxies for pre-epidemic public good provision are computed as the district-level averages of the
responses to the following Afrobarometer (wave 5) questions: ‘Are the following facilities present in the
primary sampling unit/enumeration area, or within easy walking distance: School?’ ‘Are the following
facilities present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area, or within easy walking distance: Police
station?’ ‘Are the following facilities present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area, or within
easy walking distance: Health clinic?’ For each of the questions, the answer can be either yes or no.
23Data on temperature and rainfall are drawn from the CRU TS v4.01 dataset provided by the Climate
Research Unit, University of East Anglia. The drought index is based on data taken from the SPEI Global
Drought Monitor.
24More than 70% of the total labour force is employed in the agricultural sector in all three countries.
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Table 3: Correlations Simulated Prevalence and District-Level Characteristics
Coefficient Standard Error Obs.
Model Inputs
Population (SD) 0.076*** 0.026 61
Network Distance to Guéckédou (SD) 0.070** 0.027 61
Spatial Characteristics
Distance to Guéckédou (SD) -0.097 0.062 61
Distance to capital (SD) -0.019 0.034 61
Distance to national border (SD) -0.018 0.034 61
Longitude (SD) 0.011 0.042 61
Latitude (SD) -0.161 0.097 61
Public Goods 2013
School nearby (SD) 0.000 0.022 61
Health clinic nearby (SD) -0.021 0.029 61
Police station nearby (SD) 0.061 0.043 61
Economic Characteristics
Value crop production per capita (SD) -0.048 0.029 61
Presence of minerals (SD) 0.084 0.051 61
∆ rainfall (SD) 0.135 0.105 61
∆ temperature (SD) -0.015 0.028 61
∆ drought index (SD) -0.009 0.025 61
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Table depicts the results of district-level regressions of predicted prevalence on
district-level characteristics and country-fixed effects. White-Huber standard errors are reported.
6.1 Ebola Exposure and State Legitimacy
We start our analysis by employing our 2SLS approach to examine whether greater ex-
posure to the Ebola epidemic differentially increased legitimacy of the state, as proxied
by trust in various government agencies.25 The result presented in column (1) of Table
4 documents that trust in parliament increased with EVD transmission intensity. One
additional Ebola case per 100,000 people raises trust by 0.165 standard deviations. This
implies that a one-standard deviation increase in Ebola exposure raises trust by econom-
ically meaningful 0.24 standard deviations. The point estimate is significant at the 99
percent confidence level and the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic for the excluded
instrument of 14.95 indicates that the probability of a bias due to weak instruments is low.
Trust in president (column (2)) and police (column (3))—an agency involved in the im-
25The corresponding reduced-form estimates are reported in Table C.1
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plementation and maintenance of control measures—also increase. Coefficient sizes as well
as levels of statistical significance are similar compared to the results presented in column
(1). The Ebola-induced effects on legitimacy are also reflected in a higher willingness to
pay taxes, or as phrased in the Afrobarometer survey, a lower inclination to refuse to pay
taxes. The point estimate reported in column (4) implies that an additional Ebola case per
100,000 people reduces the propensity to refuse to pay taxes by 0.19 standard deviations.
Table 4: Ebola Exposure and State Legitimacy
Trust in Parliament Trust in President Trust in Police Refusal to Pay Taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ebola 0.165*** 0.172*** 0.136*** -0.191**
prevalence (0.060) (0.051) (0.050) (0.085)
First stage regression: Ebola prevalence
Simulated 2.851*** 2.851*** 2.851*** 2.851***
Ebola prevalence (0.737) (0.737) (0.737) (0.737)
Country×year FE yes yes yes yes
District FE yes yes yes yes
Individual-level controls×year FE yes yes yes yes
Obs. 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201
F-test excl. IV 14.95 14.95 14.95 14.95
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The F-test represents the
first-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic for the excluded instrument.
Taken together, the results of Table 4 show that state legitimacy increased with exposure
to the Ebola epidemic. They do not, however, provide any insights into the underlying
channels. As outlined in the introduction, potential mechanisms are differences in govern-
ment response as well as perception thereof. Before investigating the plausibility of these
channels, we first discuss concerns related to our identification strategy.
Threats to Identification and Robustness
The identifying assumption underlying our analysis is that simulation-derived predicted
prevalence influences state legitimacy only via its effect on realised Ebola prevalence. Since
(time-invariant) population numbers and network connectivity are inputs in our disease
generation process, one immediate concern is that these factors impact state legitimacy
directly, i.e., not only indirectly via their influence on the Ebola diffusion process. If this
is the case, our estimates could pick up these Ebola-unrelated effects. However, due to
the inclusion of district fixed effects in all our regressions, this would pose a threat to
our identification strategy only if these input factors influenced state legitimacy via an
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Ebola-unrelated channel and the magnitude of this effect changed between the pre-and
post epidemic period. Similarly, for time-invariant (pre-epidemic) characteristics, such
as the availability of public goods or economic structure of a district,to bias our results,
they would have to be correlated with simulated Ebola exposure and additionally exhibit
time-varying effects.26 While the limited extend of correlation between simulated Ebola
prevalence (Table 3) indicates that the existence of such effects are unlikely, we formally
address these concerns. To this end, we augment our regression setup to include all variables
listed in Table 3, where time-invariant characteristics are interacted with time period fixed
effects to generate temporal variation. Table E.1 documents that coefficient estimates
remain stable, albeit somewhat less precisely estimated.
Another worry related to the violation of the exclusion restriction is that simulated preva-
lence influences state legitimacy through channels other than actual observed Ebola preva-
lence. This could be the case, for example, if health authorities used simulation-based
forecasts to inform their decision making. Simulations could then influence state legiti-
macy not through actual, but prevented Ebola exposure. However, the existence of such
exposure-unrelated simulation-induced effects are unlikely due to the lack of realtime data.
Refined subnationally disaggregated epidemiological data, a prerequisite for forecasting the
diffusion processes within countries, only became publicly available after November 2014,
i.e., after the major surge in case numbers had already subsided (Chowell et al., 2017).
Furthermore, limited coordination and sharing among (primarily academic) groups that
worked on developing forecasting models as well as lags in dissemination meant that spa-
tiotemporal simulation models stratified at the subnational level became only available late
in the epidemic and were of limited use to policy makers (Chretien et al., 2015; Chowell
et al., 2017).27,28 We provide more formal evidence that simulation-based interventions do
not bias our results by showing that we obtain very similar estimates if we consider only
Ebola cases (observed as well as predicted) that occurred before November 2014 in the
construction of our exposure measures (Table E.2).29 Additionally, we implement the pro-
26A conceivable example for such a time-varying effect is that the valuation of existing public goods
changes between the pre- and post epidemic period.
27Additional (suggestive) evidence for simulations not playing a role in the coordination of relief efforts
within countries is the fact that the predictive power of our instrument is strong. If resources had been
(effectively) allocated based on simulations, one would expect simulated prevalence to convey only limited
information regarding the actual path and intensity of the epidemic.
28The first subnational spatiotemporal EVD simulation models were published in early 2015 (Chretien
et al., 2015).
29This results is not surprising as the correlation between overall prevalence rate (computed as the
average prevalence rate between the start of the epidemic and the start of the Afrobaromter surveys) and
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cedure developed in Conley et al. (2012) to gauge how sensitive our estimates are to small
violations of the exclusion restriction. The results in Table E.3 suggest that the effects of
the epidemic persist even when we allow the direct effect of the instrument, i.e., the viola-
tion of the exclusion restriction, to be up to 50% of the magintude of the (instrumented)
effect of prevalence.
A further potential concern is that our simulation model does not specifically capture
the spatiotemporal diffusion process of the EVD epidemic, but other, Ebola-unrelated
spatial diffusion processes, such as the dispersion of information. To mitigate this concern,
we conduct two falsification tests. First, we simulate the epidemic one thousand times,
each time initiating the simulation at a randomly drawn starting point rather than the
true one. As documented in columns (1)–(4) of Table 5, the resulting simulations have
no predictive power regarding actual transmission intensity. The first-stage F-statistic is
1.06. This strongly suggests that our results, more specifically the predictive power of
the simulations, are unlikely to have arisen due to chance. It also implies that if our
results were, in fact, driven by an Ebola-unrelated process, this process would have to (a)
progress across space and time in the same manner as our Ebola simulation model and
(b) start at the same location. To document that the existence of such a process is highly
unlikely, we conduct a second falsification test. Therein, we initiate the simulations at the
true starting point (i.e., Guéckédou) and analyse how the epidemic is predicted to spread
across the three neighbouring countries Ivory Coast, Mali and Senegal. While in direct
proximity to the epicentre of the West African Ebola outbreak, these countries did not
see widespread transmission. In total, only nine cases were reported for the three nations
(WHO, 2016a).30 If our model specifically captures the Ebola diffusion process, simulated
prevalence should not exert an effect on state legitimacy due to the lack of transmission.
To test whether this is the case, we compile pre-and post-epidemic individual-level survey
data for the three neighbouring countries in analogy to the procedure described in Section
5.31 We then investigate if simulated prevalence influences state legitimacy using regression
setup Eq.(1). The resulting reduced-form estimates, shown in Table 5, columns (5)–(8),
reassuringly produce null results throughout. Coefficients are statistically non-significant
pre-November prevalence rate (computed as the average between the start of the epidemic and November
2014) is above 0.85, for both observed and simulated prevalence. We also obtain similar results if we only
include observations/simulations prior mid September 2014, i.e., prior to the large influx of international
resources.
30For Ivory Coast, no cases were reported. Mali reported eight cases while one case occurred in Senegal
(WHO, 2016a).
31Simulations and data are described in Appendix D.
21
and close to zero.
Table 5: Falsification Exercises
Random Starting Point Reduced-Form Regressions Neighbouring Countries
Trust in Trust in Trust Refusal to Trust in Trust in Trust in Refusal to
Parliament President Police Pay Taxes Parliament President Police Pay Taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ebola -0.189 -0.310 0.056 -0.162
prevalence (0.241) (0.418) (0.215) (0.498)
First stage regression: Ebola prevalence
Simulated 0.191 0.191 0.191 0.191 -0.056 -0.063 -0.012 0.083
Ebola prevalence (0.186) (0.186) (0.186) (0.186) (0.083) (0.126) (0.099) (0.068)
Country×year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
District FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Indiv. controls×year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,589 6,589 6,589 6,589
F-test excl. IV 1.060 1.060 1.060 1.060
Region Ebola Ebola Ebola Ebola Neighbour Neighbour Neighbour Neighbour
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The F-test represents the
first-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic for the excluded instrument.
In Appendix E we conduct a number of robustness checks to further document the stability
of our estimates. To demonstrate that our results are not driven by outliers, we re-define
the Ebola exposure measure (as well as the instrument) as the logarithmised prevalence
(plus one) and rerun the regressions of Table 4. The results remain qualitatively unal-
tered (Table E.4). Similarly, point estimates remain stable when dropping one region at a
time (Figures E.1–E.4).32 To address concerns related to the possibility that unaccounted
spatial correlation in the error terms influences statistical inference, we implement two
alternative standard error computing procedures, both based on the approach developed
in Conley (1999). In the first case, we take the common approach and allow for spatial
autocorrelation across districts that declines linearly in geographic distance up to a cut-
off of 150 kilometers.33 In the second case, we adapt the Conley (1999) approach to the
spatial structure of the network used in our simulations. Specifically, we use the bilateral
connectivity between two districts—defined in Eq.(5)—as weighting kernel (cf. Acemoglu
et al., 2015). With both approaches, we obtain very similar standard errors compared to
the ones presented in the main part (Tables E.6–E.7). While these results suggest that
inference is not biased due to unaccounted spatial correlation in the error terms, they are
uninformative about the extent of spatial spillovers in Ebola prevalence itself.
32This also implies that our results are robust to omitting Guéckédou prefecture, i.e., the (endogenous)
starting point of our simulations.
33This corresponds to the average distance to the second-neighbour district. The results are stable to
varying the cut-off.
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High Ebola transmission intensity in nearby districts could influence people’s perception
of the government either directly—through spatial spillovers of Ebola cases—or through
Ebola-induced changes of state legitimacy in neighbouring regions, i.e., through spatial
spillovers of state legitimacy. To investigate this possibility, we compute the (distance
weighted) average simulated Ebola prevalence of the first and second neighbours for each
district.34 We then include this spatial lag as an additional regressor, in the first-stage,
reduced-form and the IV setup. The point estimate of the spatial lag in the first-stage re-
gression is, albeit statistically insignificant, positive and economically non-negligible (Table
E.8, column (1)). This is unsurprising as both, the simulated and the actual epidemic dif-
fuse across space, implying that the (simulated) transmission intensity in the nearby district
have (some) predictive power regarding observed prevalence in the own district. However,
this result does not suggests the presence of spatial spillovers of Ebola-prevalence-related
effects. Conditional on simulated Ebola prevalence of the ‘home district’, the spatial lag
does not influence state legitimacy.35 The coefficient of the spatial lag is non-significant
and close to zero in both the reduced-form and the IV regressions (Table E.8 columns
(2)–(4) and Table E.9), while the size of the direct (i.e., district specific) estimates are
unaffected. Together the results suggests that spatial spillovers do not play a prominent
role in explaining the findings of Table 4.
In a final robustness check, we show that our results are not specific to the choice of
parameter values. Our 2SLS estimates remain stable if we allow R(t) to fluctuate within
the range of 1.56 to 2.51 (Tables E.10–E.11).36
6.2 Potential Mechanisms
As outlined in the introduction, we argue that the positive effects of Ebola exposure on
state legitimacy are due to changes in people’s perception induced by the government’s
response to the epidemic, rather than the direct result of the disease itself. Potential
mechanisms underlying such response-induced changes in perception are differential valu-
ation or effectiveness of control measures. Below, we investigate the plausibility of these
34This is in keeping with the approach used in computing the Conley (1999) standard errors that correct
for spatial correlation. Changing the cut-off produces very similar results.
35The spatial lag even remains statistically non-significant if we do not control for the exposure of the
own district.
36These values represents the top and bottom quintile of all R(t) estimates reviewed in Van Kerkhove
et al. (2015).
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channels.37 It is important to note that the subsequent analysis should be interpreted as
suggestive evidence. Lack of detailed information on location, type and effectiveness of con-
trol measures as well as people’s perceptions thereof prevent us from cleanly disentangling
(the relative importance of) individual channels.
Valuation
A potentially important mechanism linking Ebola exposure to state legitimacy is differen-
tial valuation of control measures. As illustrated in Figure 3, we argue that perceived risk
of contracting Ebola was higher in regions with more intense Ebola transmission, leading
to greater valuation of control measures. To empirically investigate the plausibility of this
Figure 3: Potential Mechanism: Valuation of Control Measures.
mechanism, we conducted a (cross-sectional) retrospective SMS-message-based survey in
Liberia using the GeoPoll mobile surveying platform. For Liberia, but not for Guinea
and Sierra Leone, this platform allows for subnationally representative sampling in terms
of age and sex. In our surveys, we asked individuals about their views on risk of con-
tracting Ebola as well as valuation and necessity of control measures. Furthermore, we
elicited information on age, sex, education as well as the district (county) the respondent
was living in during the epidemic.38 In total, 512 individuals submitted their answers.
After dropping incomplete responses, the sample is reduced to 403 observations.39 For
the empirical analysis, we match each GeoPoll survey respondent to the average Ebola
prevalence of her/his county of residence during the epidemic. The summary statistics of
37Due to the lack of detailed data on implementing agency, success of control measures and people’s
perception of these policies, we cannot gauge the extent to which the subsequent results are the reflection
of citizens (falsely) attributing the success of Ebola eradication to the government’s actions (rather than
international organizations). However, accounts indicate that, while resources and know-how were to a
large part provided by international organisations, governments were heavily involved in the coordination
and implementation of the Ebola control measures (DuBois et al., 2015; Marston et al., 2017).
38Questions are listed at the bottom of Table 6. Survey was conducted in October 2017.
39Observations are primarily dropped because we could not infer the individual’s place of residence at
the time of the epidemic. The results do not change if we use the full sample and assume that the county
of residence did not change for individuals we have no information on district of residence during the
epidemic.
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the resulting dataset are presented in Table F.1.40 In the following cross-sectional regres-
sions, we control for age, sex, education, and urban residency fixed effects.41 The results
are presented in Table 6. The first column shows that simulation-based Ebola prevalence
Table 6: Ebola Exposure and Valuation: Retrospective Mobile Phone Survey (Liberia)
Perceived Ebola Valuation Control Success Control Willingness to Finance
Risk (SD)a Measures (SD)b Measures (SD) b Public Goods (SD)d
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Simulated 1.234***
Ebola prevalence (0.466)
Perceived 0.332*** 0.287* 0.752***
Ebola risk (0.104) (0.171) (0.276)
First stage regression: Perceived Ebola Risk (SD)
Simulated 2.234** 2.234** 2.234**
Ebola prevalence (0.513) (0.513) (0.513)
Individual-level controls yes yes yes yes
Obs. 403 403 403 403
F-test excl. IV 5.787 5.787 5.787
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Individual-level controls include age fixed effects, education fixed effects, urban
status and gender.
a ’Perceived Ebola Measures (SD)’ is the answer to the question: How high would you personally say was the risk of
contracting Ebola in your region during the epidemic? Very low, low, high, very high.
b ’Valuation Control Measures (SD)’ is the answer to the question: How high is your valuation of the Ebola containment
measures implemented by the central government? Very low, low, high, very high.
c ’Success Control Measures (SD)’ is the answer to the question: Have the Ebola control measures implemented by the
government reduced your risk of contracting Ebola? Strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree.
d ’Willingness to Finance Public Goods (SD)’ is the answer to the question: Would you be willing to pay more taxes to
finance public goods (such as Ebola containment measures) because of your experience during the epidemic? Yes, no.
statistically significantly increases the perceived risk of contracting Ebola, an ordinal vari-
able ranging from very low (1) to very high (4). This finding provides additional support
for the Ebola-specificity of our instrument. The result in column (2) illustrates that the
perceived Ebola risk—instrumented with simulated prevalence—increases the valuation of
Ebola containment measures.42 Similarly, Ebola control measures provided by the central
government are judged to have been more important in reducing transmission in regions
where perceived Ebola risk was greater (column (3)). Finally, column (4) documents that,
as a result of the personal experience during the epidemic, the willingness to pay taxes ear-
40Compared to the Afrobarometer data, the age and sex distribution are very similar (see Table F.1).
However, the GeoPoll data over-samples urban residents and highly educated individuals.
41The second-stage regression takes the following form: yi,d = α + βÊi,d + ΦXi,d + εi,d, where yi,d is
the outcome variable of individual i living in district d, Êi,d is the (predicted) prevalence in district d, and
vector Xi,d includes the individual-level controls.
42We get similar results if we replace perceived Ebola risk with Ebola prevalence.
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marked for financing public goods is higher for individuals that saw the risk of contracting
Ebola as being high. Overall, the results of Table 6 provide support for differential valua-
tion of control measures being a potentially important mechanism underlying the observed
relative increase in state legitimacy in regions where the Ebola transmission intensity was
high.
Heterogeneities
In addition to raising the valuation for a given level of public good provision, state le-
gitimacy could also have increased due to more public resources being directed towards
districts with higher Ebola exposure. Studies based on field work from India, for example,
document that the local provision of public goods and services by the government increases
state visibility and legitimacy (Corbridge et al., 2005). To investigate whether variation
in the quantity of Ebola relief efforts underlies our findings, we first establish that more
resources were allocated to districts that experienced intense transmission. As a proxy for
resources, we use the number of Ebola treatment units, Ebola test laboratories and Ebola
community care centres in a given district.43 Table 7 shows that all three measures of
response intensity increase with EVD exposure.
In a second step, we investigate if this exposure-induced increased provision of resources
can help explain our main results. To this end, we divide the districts into two groups, ac-
cording to whether the amount of resources received lay above or below the country-specific
median.44 We then investigate the existence of heterogeneities by estimating separate slope
coefficients for these two groups using our main individual-level Afrobarometer dataset.45,46
As depicted in columns (1) and (4) of Table 8, the resulting estimates exhibit the expected
pattern. The estimates of Ebola exposure on trust in parliament and president are larger
43Ebola treatment units (ETUs) were usually large facilities equipped to isolate patients and provide
clinical care. Community care centres, were established to bring ‘disease prevention and control capabilities
to the community-level to complement larger and more centralized ETUs.’ (UNICEF, 2016).
44The classification is based on the total number of Ebola facilities, i.e., the sum of Ebola control centers,
Ebola test laboratories and Ebola community care centres.
45We have opted to estimate separate slope coefficients when analysing heterogeneities rather than
introducing a simple interaction term. Econometrically, the two approaches are equivalent. However,
differences are more clearly (directly) illustrated when estimating separate slope coefficients. Formally, the
second-stage regression is given by: yi,d,c,t = βH Id × Êi,d,c,t + βL (1− Id) × Êi,d,c,t + ΦXi,d,c,t + µd,c +
γc,t + εi,d,c,t, where Id represents an indicator variable that takes the value one if the district belongs to
the group that received above-median resources and zero otherwise. The set of controls is analogous the
one included in previous regressions. We flexibly allow these controls to exert a different effect in the two
years as well as across the two groups by interacting them with year-group dummies.
46The results of the first-stage regressions are show in Tables G.1–G.2.
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for the group of districts that received relatively more resources.47
Table 7: Ebola Exposure and Ebola Interventions: Cross-Section Analysis
Ebola Treatment Units (SD)a Ebola Laboratories (SD)a Ebola Community Care Centres (SD)a
(1) (2) (3)
Ebola 0.381*** 0.656*** 0.533***
Prevalence (0.125) (0.083) (0.131)
First stage regression: Ebola prevalence
Simulated 1.670** 1.670** 1.670**
Ebola prevalence (0.672) (0.672) (0.672)
Country FE yes yes yes
Obs. 61 61 61
F-test excl. IV 6.170 6.170 6.170
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
a ‘Ebola Treatment Units (SD)’ represents the number of Ebola treatment units (z-score). ‘Ebola Laboratories (SD)’
represents the number of Ebola laboratories (z-score). ‘Ebola Community Care Centres (SD)’ represents the number of
Ebola community care centres (z-score). Regressions run at the district level; White-Huber standard errors are reported.
We control for country fixed effects. Data sources: https://data.humdata.org/ebola and https://data.hdx.rwlabs.org/
dataset/ebola-treatment-centers.
In addition to resource-allocation-related heterogeneities, a natural expectation is that
the effect of the epidemic on trust in government depends on the effectiveness of relief
efforts (cf., Gasper and Reeves, 2011; Cole et al., 2012). Absent data on effectiveness of
control measures, we use the difference between predicted and observed Ebola prevalence
as a measure of implied effectiveness. We then again classify districts into two groups,
depending on whether implied effectiveness is above or below the country-specific median.
The estimates for the separate slope coefficients are reported in columns (2) and (5) of
Table 8. Aligning with expectations, we find that the effect of Ebola exposure is greater in
regions where the epidemic was (relatively) less virulent than predicted by our simulation
model.
So far, Table 8 provides suggestive evidence that differences in quantity and quality of
relief efforts are potentially important in explaining why greater Ebola exposure increased
state legitimacy. In a final step, we move from analysing heterogeneities in government
response to investigating heterogeneities along the political dimension. Specifically, we
test whether the effect of the epidemic varies with representation in government. In areas
where people are excluded from the political decision making process (i.e., in politically
alienated regions), the ability to eradicate a highly infectious disease may have provided
a relatively stronger signal of government quality. Furthermore, the epidemic required
47For brevity, we only report results from regressions in which trust in parliament and president are
used as dependent variables.
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the central government to involve and coordinate with local leaders and communities in
their eradication efforts (see Section 3). This increase in cooperation plausibly increased
Table 8: Heterogeneities
Trust in Parliament Trust in President
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High × 0.215*** 0.524*** 0.102 0.172** 0.505** 0.088
Ebola prevalence (0.080) (0.141) (0.066) (0.069) (0.211) (0.055)
Low × 0.048 0.095 0.375** 0.083 0.065 0.489**
Ebola prevalence (0.071) (0.135) (0.164) (0.071) (0.095) (0.243)
Country×year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
District FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual controls×year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201
F-test excl. IVs 5.76,19.55 39.57,3.14 34.34,20.22 5.76,19.55 39.57,3.14 34.34,20.22
P-value equality (one-sided) 0.060 0.011 0.080 0.184 0.024 0.053
Heterogeneity
# Ebola Difference predicted Representation # Ebola Difference predicted Representation
facilities observed prevalence in government facilities observed prevalence in government
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The F-test represents the
first-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic for the excluded instruments. P-value equality represents the p-value for the one-
sided test of equality of coefficients between High and Low group. In columns (1), (2), (4) and (5), we test the hypothesis
High¿Low; in columns (3) and (6), we test the hypothesis Low¿High. First-stage regressions shown in Tables G.1 and G.2.
trust in central government, especially in politically alienated regions (Acaps, 2015; Carter
et al., 2017). To test for differential effects along the political dimension, we classify
districts according to their political representation in government. Based on data from
the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Dataset (Wimmer et al., 2009), we define districts as
having no political influence if the majority of the population is of an ethnicity that is
not represented in government as junior or senior partner. Separately estimating effects
for these two groups unveils that the Ebola-related effects on trust are particularly strong
in regions which are not represented in government (Table 8, columns (3) and (6)). This
indicates that the provision of public goods is especially effective in fostering trust when
individuals are politically excluded.
From Perception to Accountability
As a final step in our study, we turn to analysing Ebola-related effect on presidential
election outcomes. Compared to our previous analysis, where we assessed the effects on
trust in government entities, there are two important differences. First, rather than looking
at changes in legitimacy, we are now focussing on changes in behaviour. Second, the subject
of our analysis is no longer the state (as proxied by parliament, president and police), but
the political party of the incumbent president. While maybe subtle, these differences are
important. The Ebola-related relative improvement in state legitimacy documented above
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will only be reflected in increased vote shares if people (partly) attribute the successful
eradication to the actions of the president and her/his political party. While not necessary,
the fact that the presidents were directly involved in the crisis management in all three
countries (see Section 3) suggests that this may have been the case.
To empirically asses the effects of the epidemic on voting outcomes, we collect district-
level information on the share of total votes received by the presidential candidate of
the incumbent party in the first round of the presidential elections before and after the
Ebola epidemic, respectively.48,49 Using this district-level panel data, we then investigate
whether a greater exposure to the epidemic lead to a differential change in the support for
the candidate of the incumbent party. The regression approach employed is analogous to
the one introduced in Section 4, the sole difference being that we operate at the district
rather than the individual level.50
A caveat pertains to the interpretation of the subsequent results. Because we do not possess
information on voter turnout or characteristics of voters, we cannot separately analyse the
effects of the epidemic on mobilisation and persuasion of voters. The following results
therefore capture the overall effects which include both the change in voter turnout as
well as the shifts in voting behaviour among people who voted in pre-and post epidemic
elections.
The result depicted in column (1) of Table 9 suggests that one additional Ebola case per
100,000 people increases the vote share of the candidate of the incumbent party by 0.207
standard deviations. This corresponds to an increase of 5.8 percentage points, indicating
that the effect is economically non-negligible.51,52 To support the interpretation that this
result is induced by differences in the response to the epidemic (or perception thereof)
rather than variation in exposure to the disease itself, we investigate the existence of
48The first-round elections took place in June 2010 and October 2015 (Guinea), October 2011 and
October 2017 (Liberia), and November 2012 and March 2018 (Sierra Leone).
49We use the vote share for the presidential candidate of the incumbent party (rather than the incumbent
president her-/himself) as the dependent variable because the incumbent presidents were constitutionally
ineligible to run for another term in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Our focus on presidential rather than
parliamentary elections is motivated by the fact that the election outcomes represent a measure for the
support in ruling persons (and parties) that is uniform across time and space. This is not the case, for
example, for parliamentary or local elections, where the party in power can vary across districts.
50Specifically, the second-stage regression takes the following form: vd,c,t = βÊd,c,t + µd,c + γc,t + εd,c,t,
where vd,c,t is the vote share for the presidential candidate of the incumbent party in district d of country c
in year t, Êd,c,t is predicted Ebola prevalence, µd,c represents district fixed effects, and γc,t are country-year
dummies.
51The sample mean of the vote share for the presidential candidate of the incumbent party is 38%.
52This result is robust to dropping one country at a time.
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Table 9: Ebola Exposure and Vote Share Presidential Candidate
Vote Share Presidential Candidate of Incumbent Party
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ebola prevalence 0.207***
(0.064)
High × 0.216*** 0.286** 0.154*
Ebola prevalence (0.073) (0.119) (0.083)
Low × -0.007 0.139 0.272***
Ebola prevalence (0.128) (0.094) (0.102)
District FE yes yes yes yes
Country-year FE yes yes yes yes
Obs. 122 122 122 122
F-test excl. IV(s) 6.33 3.53, 3,42 308.71, 16.27 14.50, 66.89
P-value equality (one-sided) 0.061 0.168 0.179
Heterogeneity
# Ebola facilities Difference predicted Representation
observed prevalence in government
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Regressions run at the district-year level. Standard errors are clustered at
the district level. The F-test represents the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic for the excluded instrument(s). P-value
equality represents the p-value for the one-sided test of equality of coefficients between High and Low group. In columns (2)
and (3), we test the hypothesis High¿Low; in column (4), we test the hypothesis Low¿High. First-stage regressions shown
in Tables G.3–G.4. Data sources: Guinea: http://www.ceniguinee.org, Liberia: http://www.necliberia.org, and Sierra
Leone https://electiondata.io.
heterogeneities in analogy to Table 8. The results, shown in columns (2)–(4) of Table 9,
exhibit the familiar pattern. An Ebola-induced differential increase in the vote share is
only observable in districts that experienced an above-median influx of response-related
resources. Similarly, the effect of the epidemic is more pronounced in regions where the
epidemic was (relatively) less intense than predicted by our simulation model (column
(3)). Together, these results suggest that the success of control measures was (partly)
attributed to the party of the incumbent president, leading to a relative increase in support
in areas where the quantity and implied quality of control efforts was relatively high.53
These findings parallel results from studies which show that vote shares of incumbents
increase when the government’s response to natural disasters is robust (e.g., Bechtel and
Hainmueller, 2011; Gasper and Reeves, 2011). The result of column (4) further shows that
the effect of the epidemic was stronger, albeit statistically insignificantly so, in politically
alienated regions. A possible interpretation of this finding is that the signal of quality of
the incumbent party was relatively stronger in areas that are excluded from the political
decision making process. Taken together, the results of this last part indicate that the
53Note that it lies outside the scope of this study to analyse to what extent the Ebola epidemic was
exploited for strategic electoral purposes, e.g., by postponing elections or by disproportionately allocating
resources to swing districts.
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electorate holds the party in power accountable for its action during health emergencies.
7 Conclusion
Our study documents that the provision of a common-interest public good—in our case
triggered by the need to react to a devastating epidemic—increases state legitimacy, an
otherwise slowly evolving determinant of economic development, within a short period of
time. This suggests that governments can use one-time, large scale, provisions of common-
interest public goods as an instrument to increase legitimacy and thereby overcome histor-
ically rooted capacity constraints. The case of the West African Ebola epidemic further
suggests that, by supporting government policies, international organizations can play an
important role in promoting state legitimacy. When interpreting our results, it is important
to keep in mind that we focus on a very specific effect of the West African Ebola epidemic.
While Ebola-induced changes in state legitimacy have positive implications for economic
development, we cannot draw any conclusions regarding the overall welfare effects of the
epidemic. In the short run, the effects of the epidemic have certainly been devastating.
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Table A.1: Parameter Values Simulations
Variable Name Afrobarometer Question
Trust in Parliament How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough
about them to say: The President?
Trust in President How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough
about them to say: Parliament?
Trust in Police How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough
about them to say: The Police?
Refusal to Pay Taxes Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens when they are
dissatisfied with government performance. For each of these, please tell me
whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year.
If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Refused to pay a tax or fee to
government.
Notes: Possible responses are ordinal. Values between 0 (low) and 3 (high).
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B Probability Density Functions
Figure B.1: Figure depicts the Kernel density of R(t) estimates reviewed in Van Kerkhove et al. (2015) for
two subsets of studies: studies that base estimates on data of the West African Ebola epidemic (2013–2016)
and studies that rely on non-West African data for estimation.
Figure B.2: Figure depicts the Kernel densities of predicted and observed average prevalence rates.
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C Reduced-Form Regressions
Table C.1: Simulated Ebola Exposure and State Legitimacy
Trust in Parliament Trust in President Trust in Police Refusal to Pay Taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Simulated 0.472*** 0.489*** 0.388** -0.543***
Ebola prevalence (0.169) (0.167) (0.160) (0.169)
Country×Year FE yes yes yes yes
District FE yes yes yes yes
Individual-level controls×year FE yes yes yes yes
Obs. 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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D Data Construction Neighbouring Countries
The individual-level dataset for the three countries neighbouring the epicentre of the Ebola
epidemic—Ivory Coast, Mali and Senegal—is constructed in analogy to our main dataset.
Pre-epidemic information is drawn from Afrobarometer survey round 5, post-epidemic
Figure D.1: Figure depicts subnational units (shaded grey) in Ivory Coast, Mali and Senegal for which
prevalence rates are predicted using simulation model Eq.(6).
data from round 6. Simulated Ebola prevalence is generated using the simulation model
described in Section 5.2 (Eq.(6)). We start the simulations in Guéckédou and then analyse
how the epidemic is predicted to spread across the districts (defined as the second subna-
tional administrative level) of the three neighbouring countries at a weekly interval. The
geographic scope of the dataset along with the units for which Ebola exposure is predicted
is shown in Figure D.1.
Following the procedure outlined in Section 5, we run these simulations one thousand
times and compute the mode for each district and week. Simulated Ebola exposure is then
computed as the average predicted Ebola prevalence between the start of the epidemic and
the beginning of the survey fieldwork in the district in which the individual resides.54 To
investigate whether simulated prevalence influences state legitimacy, we run the following




yi,d,c,t = θ Si,d,c,t + ΩXi,d,c,t + αd,c + τc,t + ψi,d,c,t, (D.1)
where yi,d,c,t represents the outcome for individual i residing in district d and country c
in year t. Predicted Ebola prevalence (Si,d,c,t), reflects the average simulated number of
Ebola cases per 100,000 people in individual i’s district of residence d (located in country
c) in year t. The vector Xi,d,c,t contains individual-level controls. In all regressions we
allow these characteristics to have different effects in the pre- and post epidemic era by
interacting them with a year-specific dummy. District-specific fixed effects are symbolised
by αd,c, country-time-fixed effects by τc,t, and the idiosyncratic error term by ψi,d,c,t. The
regression results are depicted in Table 5, columns (5)–(8).
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E Robustness
Table E.1: Robustness Inclusion of District-Level Characteristics
Trust in Parliament Trust in President Trust in Police Refusal to Pay Taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ebola 0.143** 0.142** 0.153** -0.153**
prevalence (0.073) (0.065) (0.076) (0.067)
First stage regression: Ebola prevalence
Simulated 2.813*** 2.813*** 2.813*** 2.813***
Ebola prevalence (0.682) (0.682) (0.693) (0.682)
Country×year FE yes yes yes yes
District FE yes yes yes yes
Individual-level controls×year FE yes yes yes yes
Time-invariant district-level FE yes yes yes yes
characteristics×year
Time-varying district-level yes yes yes yes
characteristics
Obs. 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201
F-test excl. IV 17.02 17.02 17.02 17.02
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The F-test represents the
first-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic for the excluded instrument.
Table E.2: (Simulated) Ebola prevalence computed using time-period December 2013–October
2014.
Trust in Parliament Trust in President Trust in Police Refusal to Pay Taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ebola 0.119*** 0.123*** 0.098*** -0.131**
prevalence (0.039) (0.035) (0.035) (0.060)
First stage regression: Ebola prevalence
Simulated 2.855*** 2.855*** 2.855*** 2.855***
Ebola prevalence (0.695) (0.695) (0.695) (0.695)
Country×year FE yes yes yes yes
District FE yes yes yes yes
Individual-level controls×year FE yes yes yes yes
Obs. 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201
F-test excl. IV 16.86 16.86 16.86 16.86
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The F-test represents the
first-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic for the excluded instrument.
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Table E.3: Plausibly Exogenous IVs: Union of Confidence Intervals
Trust in Parliament Trust in President Trust in Police Refusal to Pay Taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Point estimates main IV regressions (Table 4) 0.174 0.138 0.114 -0.219
σ = 0.00
95CI Lower Bound 0.049 0.071 0.039 -0.358
95CI Upper Bound 0.282 0.272 0.233 -0.023
σ = 0.05
95CI Lower Bound 0.04 0.065 0.035 -0.367
95CI Upper Bound 0.289 0.279 0.238 -0.019
σ = 0.15
95CI Lower Bound 0.034 0.054 0.025 -0.386
95CI Upper Bound 0.303 0.293 0.249 -0.010
σ = 0.25
95CI Lower Bound 0.024 0.043 0.016 -0.404
95CI Upper Bound 0.317 0.307 0.259 -0.001
Obs. 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201
Note: The table reports the point estimates of Table 4 along with the corresponding confidence intervals computed based on
the ’Union of Confidence Intervals’ (UI) method proposed by Conley et al. (2012). The UI method relaxes the assumption
that the instrument (i.e., in our case simulated Ebola prevalence) is strictly exogenous and allows for a direct influence, γ,
of the instrument on the outcome variables. The UI methods requires a pre-specified support of γ. Following Conley et
al. (2012), we define the support as [−2|β|δ, 2|β|δ] where β are our IV estimates resulting from our baseline specification in
Table 4 and δ varies within the range [0, 0.25]. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
Table E.4: Exposure measure defined as log prevalence + 1
Trust in Parliament Trust in President Trust in Police Refusal to Pay Taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Ebola 0.344** 0.399*** 0.327*** -0.417**
prevalence +1 (0.146) (0.130) (0.120) (0.195)
First stage regression: Log (Ebola prevalence +1)
Log simulated 1.896*** 1.896*** 1.896*** 1.896***
Ebola prevalence + 1 (0.295) (0.295) (0.295) (0.295)
Country×Year FE yes yes yes yes
District FE yes yes yes yes
Individual-level controls×year FE yes yes yes yes
Obs. 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201
F-test excl. IV 41.44 41.44 41.44 41.44
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The F-test represents the
first-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic for the excluded instrument.
44
Figure E.1: Dropping one district at a time: president (district IDs listed in Table E.5). The circles
represent the point estimates, the bars indicate the 90 percent confidence intervals, where the standard
errors are clustered at the district level.
Figure E.2: Dropping one district at a time: parliament (district IDs listed in Table E.5). The circles
represent the point estimates, the bars indicate the 90 percent confidence intervals, where the standard
errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure E.3: Dropping one district at a time: police (district IDs listed in Table E.5). The circles represent
the point estimates, the bars indicate the 90 percent confidence intervals, where the standard errors are
clustered at the district level.
Figure E.4: Dropping one district at a time: refusal to pay taxes (district IDs listed in Table E.5).
The circles represent the point estimates, the bars indicate the 90 percent confidence intervals, where the
standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table E.5: District IDs
ID District Country ID District Country
1 Beyla GIN 32 Yamou GIN
2 Boffa GIN 33 Bomi LBR
3 Boké GIN 34 Bong LBR
4 Conakry GIN 35 Gbapolu LBR
5 Coyah GIN 36 Grand Cape Mount LBR
6 Dabola GIN 37 Grand Bassa LBR
7 Dalaba GIN 38 Grand Gedeh LBR
8 Dinguiraye GIN 39 Grand Kru LBR
9 Dubréka GIN 40 Lofa LBR
10 Faranah GIN 41 Margibi LBR
11 Forécariah GIN 42 Maryland LBR
12 Gaoual GIN 43 Montserrado LBR
13 Guéckédou GIN 44 Nimba LBR
14 Kankan GIN 45 River Cess LBR
15 Kindia GIN 46 River Gee LBR
16 Kissidougou GIN 47 Sinoe LBR
17 Koubia GIN 48 Bo SLE
18 Koundara GIN 49 Bombali SLE
19 Kouroussa GIN 50 Bonthe SLE
20 Kérouané GIN 51 Kailahun SLE
21 Labé GIN 52 Kambia SLE
22 Lola GIN 53 Kenema SLE
23 Lélouma GIN 54 Koinadugu SLE
24 Macenta GIN 55 Kono SLE
25 Mali GIN 56 Moyamba SLE
26 Mamou GIN 57 Port Loko SLE
27 Nzérékoré GIN 58 Pujehun SLE
28 Pita GIN 59 Tonkolili SLE
29 Siguiri GIN 60 Western Rural SLE
30 Tougué GIN 61 Western Urban SLE
31 Télimélé GIN
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Table E.6: Conley (1999) Standard Error Clustering Approach: Euclidean Distance Weighting
Kernel
Trust in Parliament Trust in President Trust in Police Refusal to Pay Taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ebola 0.165*** 0.172*** 0.136*** -0.191**
prevalence (0.057) (0.053) (0.052) (0.093)
First stage regression: Ebola prevalence
Simulated 2.851*** 2.851*** 2.851*** 2.851***
Ebola prevalence (0.722) (0.722) (0.722) (0.722)
Country×year FE yes yes yes yes
District FE yes yes yes yes
Individual-level controls×year FE yes yes yes yes
Obs. 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201
F-test excl. IV 15.55 15.55 15.55 15.55
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are computed using the approach proposed by Conley (1999).
The Euclidean distance weighting kernel decays linearly (cutoff: 150 kilometers). The F-test represents the first-stage
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic for the excluded instrument.
Table E.7: Conley (1999) Standard Error Clustering Approach: Network Connectivity weighted
kernel
Trust in Parliament Trust in President Trust in Police Refusal to Pay Taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ebola 0.165*** 0.172*** 0.136*** -0.191**
prevalence (0.057) (0.051) (0.050) (0.089)
First stage regression: Ebola prevalence
Simulated 2.851*** 2.851*** 2.851*** 2.851***
Ebola prevalence (0.702) (0.702) (0.702) (0.702)
Country×year FE yes yes yes yes
District FE yes yes yes yes
Individual-level controls×year FE yes yes yes yes
Obs. 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201
F-test excl. IV 16.34 16.34 16.34 16.34
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are computed using the approach proposed by Conley (1999)
adapted to the bilateral connectivity within our simulation network (mi,j in Eq. (5)). The F-test represents the first-stage
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic for the excluded instrument.
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Table E.8: Including spatial lags: First-stage and reduced-form estimates
First-Stage Regression Reduced-Form Regressions
Observed Ebola Prevalence Trust in Parliament Trust in President Trust in Police Refusal to Pay Taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Simulated 0.666*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.092*** -0.123***
Ebola prevalenced (SD) (0.180) (0.036) (0.033) (0.031) (0.033)
W × simulated 0.325 -0.018 0.017 0.034 -0.093
Ebola prevalencej 6=d (SD) (0.239) (0.080) (0.090) (0.082) (0.111)
Country×Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
District FE yes yes yes yes yes
Individual-level controls×year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are computed using the approach proposed by Conley (1999).
The Euclidean distance weighting kernel decays linearly (cut-off: 150 kilometres).
Table reports results of the following regressions:
yi,d,c,t = θ Sd,c,t + Φ
∑
j 6=d
Wd,j × Sj,c,t + ΩXi,d,c,t + αd,c + τc,t + ψi,d,c,t.
yi,d,c,t represents the outcome for individual i residing in district d and country c in year t. Simulated prevalence for district
d is represented by Sd,c,t. The summation term captures the distance-weighted average simulated prevalence in the first
and second neighbour district (j 6= d). The matrix W represents a weighting matrix, where weights are defined as the
inverse bilateral distance between district d and j. For ease of comparability, both simulated prevalence and (spatially)
lagged simulated prevalence are standardised to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
Table E.9: Including spatial lags: 2SLS-IV regressions
Trust in Parliament Trust in President Trust in Police Refusal to Pay Taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ebola 0.169*** 0.168*** 0.130*** -0.173**
prevalence (0.056) (0.052) (0.053) (0.077)
W × simulated -0.018 -0.017 -0.033 -0.093
Ebola prevalencej 6=d (SD) (0.095) (0.091) (0.081) (0.122)
First stage regression: Ebola prevalence
Simulated 0.666*** 0.666*** 0.666*** 0.666***
Ebola prevalenced (SD) (0.180) (0.180) (0.180) (0.180)
W × simulated 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.325
Ebola prevalencej 6=d (SD) (0.239) (0.239) (0.239) (0.239)
Country×year FE yes yes yes yes
District FE yes yes yes yes
Individual-level controls×year FE yes yes yes yes
Obs. 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201
F-test excl. IV 13.70 13.70 13.70 13.70
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are computed using the approach proposed by Conley (1999).
The Euclidean distance weighting kernel decays linearly (cut-off: 150 kilometres).
Table reports results of the following (second-stage) regressions:
yi,d,c,t = β Êi,d,c,t + Φ
∑
j 6=d
Wd,j × Sj,c,t + θ,Xi,d,c,t + µd,c + γc,t + εd,c,t.
yi,d,c,t represents the outcome for individual i residing in district d and country c in year t. The term Êi,d,c,t symbolises
predicted Ebola prevalence obtained from the first stage regression (see Eq.(1)). The summation term captures the distance-
weighted average of simulated prevalence in the first and second neighbour district (j 6= d). The matrix W represents
a weighting matrix, where weights are defined as the inverse bilateral distance between district d and j. For ease of
comparability, both simulated prevalence and (spatially) lagged simulated prevalence are standardised to a mean of zero
and a standard deviation of one.
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Table E.10: Varying R0 (R0 = 1.56): Ebola Exposure and State Legitimacy
Trust in Parliament Trust in President Trust in Police Refusal to Pay Taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ebola 0.227** 0.215** 0.157* -0.280**
prevalence (0.091) (0.090) (0.083) (0.121)
First stage regression: Ebola prevalence
Simulated 8.347*** 8.347*** 8.347*** 8.347***
Ebola prevalence (3.222) (3.222) (3.222) (3.222)
Country×year FE yes yes yes yes
District FE yes yes yes yes
Individual-level controls×year FE yes yes yes yes
Obs. 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201
F-test excl. IV 6.709 6.709 6.709 6.709
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The F-test represents the
first-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic for the excluded instrument.
Table E.11: Varying R0 (R0=2.51): Ebola Exposure and State Legitimacy
Trust in Parliament Trust in President Trust in Police Refusal to Pay Taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ebola 0.143*** 0.147*** 0.106** -0.152**
prevalence (0.053) (0.048) (0.049) (0.077)
First stage regression: Ebola prevalence
Simulated 3.191*** 3.191*** 3.191*** 3.191***
Ebola prevalence (0.627) (0.627) (0.627) (0.627)
Country×year FE yes yes yes yes
District FE yes yes yes yes
Individual-level controls×year FE yes yes yes yes
Obs. 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201
F-test excl. IV 25.93 25.93 25.93 25.93
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The F-test represents the
first-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic for the excluded instrument.
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F Summary Statistics GeoPoll Survey Data
Table F.1: Descriptive Statistics SMS-Based Survey
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Geopoll - Mobile Phone Survey data (Liberia)
Perceived Ebola Risk (SD) 0 1 -1.928 1.030 403
Valuation Control Measures (SD) 0 1 -2.915 0.958 403
Success Control Measures (SD) 0 1 -3.430 0.858 403
Willingness to Finance Public Goods (SD) 0 1 -2.160 0.461 403
Age 32.503 9.181 17 87 403
Gender 0.429 0.496 0 1 403
Education 2.141 0.8149 0 3 403
Urban 0.905 0 .292 0 1 403
Control Variables Afrobarometer (Liberia)
Age 35.262 11.463 18 99 2,095
Gender 0.501 0.500 0 1 2,095
Education 1.548 1.004 0 3 2,095
Urban 0.488 0.500 0 1 2,095
Note: Gender is an indicator variable that takes value one if the individual is female, and zero otherwise. Education measures
the level of formal schooling: 0: no formal education; 1: primary education; 2: secondary education; 3: post-secondary
education. Urban is an indicator variable that takes value one if the individual lives in a city or town, and zero otherwise.
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G First-Stage Regressions Heterogeneities
Table G.1: First-Stage Regressions High Groups
Dependent Variable: High Group × Ebola Prevalence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High × 2.290*** 1.069*** 4.859*** 2.290*** 1.069*** 4.859***
simulated Ebola prevalence (0.715) (0.125) (0.794) (0.715) (0.125) (0.794)
Low × -0.089 0.025 0.036 -0.089 0.025 0.036
simulated Ebola prevalence (0.754) (0.026) (0.088) (0.754) (0.026) (0.088)
Country×year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
District FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual controls×year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201
Heterogeneity
# Ebola Difference predicted Representation # Ebola Difference predicted Representation
facilities observed prevalence in government facilities observed prevalence in government
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
Table G.2: First-Stage Regressions Low Groups
Dependent Variable: Low Group × Ebola Prevalence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High × -0.010 0.051 0.003 -0.010 0.051 0.003
simulated Ebola prevalence (0.034) (0.084) (0.013) (0.034) (0.084) (0.013)
Low × 8.960*** 2.915** 1.099*** 8.960*** 2.915** 1.099***
simulated Ebola prevalence (1.530) (1.171) (0.176) (1.530) (1.171) (0.176)
Country×year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
District FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual controls×year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201 6,201
Heterogeneity
# Ebola Difference predicted Representation # Ebola Difference predicted Representation
facilities observed prevalence in government facilities observed prevalence in government
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table G.3: First-Stage Regressions: Ebola Exposure and Vote Share Presidential Candidate
Ebola Prevalence High Group × Ebola Prevalence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Simulated 1.670**
Ebola prevalence (0.664)
High × 1.327** 0.962*** 5.314***
simulated Ebola prevalence (0.505) (0.039) (1.041)
Low × -0.082 -0.367 0.111
simulated Ebola prevalence (0.976) (0.228) (0.090)
District FE yes yes yes yes
Country-year FE yes yes yes yes
Obs. 122 122 122 122
Heterogeneity
# Ebola facilities Difference predicted Representation
observed prevalence in government
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Regressions run at the district-year level. Standard errors are clustered at the
district level.
Table G.4: First-Stage Regressions: Ebola Exposure and Vote Share Presidential Candidate
Ebola Prevalence Low Group × Ebola Prevalence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High × 0.019 0.188** -0.256
simulated Ebola prevalence (0.058) (0.081) (0.208)
Low × 5.746** 4.879*** 0.983***
simulated Ebola prevalence (2.197) (1.090) (0.086)
District FE yes yes yes yes
Country-year FE yes yes yes yes
Obs. 122 122 122 122
Heterogeneity
# Ebola facilities Difference predicted Representation
observed prevalence in government
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Regressions run at the district-year level. Standard errors are clustered at the
district level.
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